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Abstract
While significant progress has been made separately on analytics systems for scalable stochastic gra-
dient descent (SGD) and private SGD, none of the major scalable analytics frameworks have incorporated
differentially private SGD. There are two inter-related issues for this disconnect between research and
practice: (1) low model accuracy due to added noise to guarantee privacy, and (2) high development and
runtime overhead of the private algorithms. This paper takes a first step to remedy this disconnect and
proposes a private SGD algorithm to address both issues in an integrated manner. In contrast to the white-
box approach adopted by previous work, we revisit and use the classical technique of output perturbation
to devise a novel “bolt-on” approach to private SGD. While our approach trivially addresses (2), it makes
(1) even more challenging. We address this challenge by providing a novel analysis of the L2-sensitivity of
SGD, which allows, under the same privacy guarantees, better convergence of SGD when only a constant
number of passes can be made over the data. We integrate our algorithm, as well as other state-of-the-art
differentially private SGD, into Bismarck, a popular scalable SGD-based analytics system on top
of an RDBMS. Extensive experiments show that our algorithm can be easily integrated, incurs
virtually no overhead, scales well, and most importantly, yields substantially better (up to 4X)
test accuracy than the state-of-the-art algorithms on many real datasets.
1 Introduction
The past decade has seen significant interest from both the data management industry and academia in
integrating machine learning (ML) algorithms into scalable data processing systems such as RDBMSs [23,
19], Hadoop [1], and Spark [2]. In many data-driven applications such as personalized medicine, finance,
web search, and social networks, there is also a growing concern about the privacy of individuals. To
this end, differential privacy, a cryptographically motivated notion, has emerged as the gold standard for
protecting data privacy. Differentially private ML has been extensively studied by researchers from the
database, ML, and theoretical computer science communities [10, 13, 15, 25, 27, 36, 37].
In this work, we study differential privacy for stochastic gradient descent (SGD), which has become the
optimization algorithm of choice in many scalable ML systems, especially in-RDBMS analytics systems.
*Work done while at UW-Madison.
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For example, Bismarck [19] offers a highly efficient in-RDBMS implementation of SGD to provide a single
framework to implement many convex analysis-based ML techniques. Thus, creating a private version of
SGD would automatically provide private versions of all these ML techniques.
While previous work has separately studied in-RDBMS SGD and differentially private SGD, our con-
versations with developers at several database companies revealed that none of the major in-RDBMS ML
tools have incorporated differentially private SGD. There are two inter-related reasons for this disconnect
between research and practice: (1) low model accuracy due to the noise added to guarantee privacy, and
(2) high development and runtime overhead of the private algorithms. One might expect that more sophis-
ticated private algorithms might be needed to address issue (1) but then again, such algorithms might in
turn exacerbate issue (2)!
To understand these issues better, we integrate two state-of-the-art differentially private SGD algorithms
– Song, Chaudhuri and Sarwate (SCS13 [35]) and Bassily, Smith and Thakurta (BST14 [10]) – into the in-
RDBMS SGD architecture of Bismarck. SCS13 adds noise at each iteration of SGD, enough to make the iterate
differentially private. BST14 reduces the amount of noise per iteration by subsampling and can guarantee
optimal convergence using O(m) passes over the data (where m is the training set size); however, in many
real applications, we can only afford a constant number of passes, and hence, we derive and implement a
version for O(1) passes. Empirically, we find that both algorithms suffer from both issues (1) and (2): their
accuracy is much worse than the accuracy of non-private SGD, while their “white box” paradigm requires
deep code changes that require modifying the gradient update steps of SGD in order to inject noise. In
turn, these changes for repeated noise sampling lead to a significant runtime overhead.
In this paper, we take a first step towards mitigating both issues in an integrated manner. In contrast to
the white box approach of prior work, we consider a new approach to differentially private SGD in which
we treat the SGD implementation as a “black box” and inject noise only at the end. In order to make this bolt-
on approach feasible, we revisit and use the classical technique of output perturbation [16]. An immediate
consequence is that our approach can be trivially integrated into any scalable SGD system, including in-
RDBMS analytics systems such as Bismarck, with no changes to the internal code. Our approach also incurs
virtually no runtime overhead and preserves the scalability of the existing system.
While output perturbation obviously addresses the runtime and integration challenge, it is unclear
what its effect is on model accuracy. In this work, we provide a novel analysis that leads to an output
perturbation procedure with higher model accuracy than the state-of-the-art private SGD algorithms. The
essence of our solution is a new bound on the L2-sensitivity of SGD which allows, under the same privacy
guarantees, better convergence of SGD when only a constant number of passes over the data can be made.
As a result, our algorithm produces private models that are significantly more accurate than both SCS13
and BST14 for practical problems. Overall, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose a novel bolt-on differentially private algorithm for SGD based on output perturbation.
An immediate consequence of our approach is that our algorithm directly inherits many desirable
properties of SGD, while allowing easy integration into existing scalable SGD-based analytics sys-
tems.
• We provide a novel analysis of the L2-sensitivity of SGD that leads to an output perturbation proce-
dure with higher model accuracy than the state-of-the-art private SGD algorithms. Importantly, our
analysis allows better convergence when one can only afford running a constant number of passes over
the data, which is the typical situation in practice. Key to our analysis is the use of the well-known
expansion properties of gradient operators [29, 31].
• We integrate our private SGD algorithms, SCS13, and BST14 into Bismarck and conduct a compre-
hensive empirical evaluation. We explain how our algorithms can be easily integrated with little
development effort. Using several real datasets, we demonstrate that our algorithms run significantly
faster, scale well, and yield substantially better test accuracy (up to 4X) than SCS13 or BST14 for the
same settings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present preliminaries. In Section 3,
we present our private SGD algorithms and analyze their privacy and convergence guarantees. Along
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the way, we extend our main algorithms in various ways to incorporate common practices of SGD. We
then perform a comprehensive empirical study in Section 4 to demonstrate that our algorithms satisfy key
desired properties for in-RDBMS analytics: ease of integration, low runtime overhead, good scalability, and
high accuracy. We provide more remarks on related theoretical work in Section 5 and conclude with future
directions in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
This section reviews important definitions and existing results.
Machine Learning and Convex ERM. Focusing on supervised learning, we have a sample space Z = X ×Y ,
where X is a space of feature vectors and Y is a label space. We also have an ordered training set ((xi , yi))
m
i=1.
LetW ⊆Rd be a hypothesis space equipped with the standard inner product and 2-norm ‖·‖. We are given a
loss function ` :W×Z 7→Rwhich measures the how well a w classifies an example (x,y) ∈ Z, so that given a
hypothesisw ∈W and a sample (x,y) ∈ Z, we have a loss `(w, (x,y)). Our goal is to minimize the empirical risk
over the training set S (i.e., the empirical risk minimization, or ERM), defined as LS (w) =
1
m
∑m
i=1 `(w, (xi , yi)).
Fixing S, `i(w) = `(w, (xi , yi)) is a function of w. In both in-RDBMS and private learning, convex ERM
problems are common, where every `i is convex. We start by defining some basic properties of loss functions
that will be needed later to present our analysis.
Definition 1. Let f :W 7→R be a function:
• f is convex if for any u,v ∈W ,
f (u) ≥ f (v) + 〈∇f (v),u − v〉
• f is L-Lipschitz if for any u,v ∈W ,
‖f (u)− f (v)‖ ≤ L‖u − v‖
• f is γ-strongly convex if
f (u) ≥ f (v) + 〈∇f (v),u − v〉+ γ2 ‖u − v‖2
• f is β-smooth if
‖∇f (u)−∇f (v)‖ ≤ β‖u − v‖
Example: Logistic Regression. The above three parameters (L, γ , and β) are derived by analyzing the
loss function. We give an example using the popular L2-regularized logistic regression model with the
L2 regularization parameter λ. This derivation is standard in the optimization literature (e.g., see [11]).
We assume some preprocessing that normalizes each feature vector, i.e., each ‖x‖ ≤ 1 (this assumption is
common for analyzing private optimization [10, 13, 35]. In fact, such preprocessing are also common for
general machine learning problems [6], not just private ones). Recall now that for L2-regularized logistic
regression the loss function on an example (x,y) with y ∈ {±1}) is defined as follows:
`(w, (x,y)) = ln
(
1 + exp(−y〈w,x〉)
)
+
λ
2
‖w‖2 (1)
Fixing λ ≥ 0, we can obtain L, γ , and β by looking at the expression for the gradient (∇`(w)) and the Hessian
(H(`(w))). L is chosen as a tight upper bound on ‖∇`(w)‖, β is chosen as a tight upper bound on ‖H(`(w))‖,
and γ is chosen such that H(`(w))  γI , i.e., H(`(w))−γI is positive semidefinite).
Now there are two cases depending on whether λ > 0 or not. If λ = 0 we do not have strong convexity
(in this case it is only convex), and we have L = β = 1 and γ = 0. If λ > 0, we need to assume a bound on
the norm of the hypothesis w. (which can be achieved by rescaling). In particular, suppose ‖w‖ ≤ R, then
together with ‖x‖ ≤ 1, we can deduce that L = 1 +λR, β = 1 +λ, and γ = λ. We remark that these are indeed
standard values in the literature for L2-regularized logistic loss [11].
The above assumptions and derivation are common in the optimization literature [11, 12]. In some ML
models, ` is not differentiable, e.g., the hinge loss for the linear SVM [4]. The standard approach in this
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case is to approximate it with a differentiable and smooth function. For example, for the hinge loss, there
is a body of work on the so-called Huber SVM [4]. In this paper, we focus primarily on logistic regression
as our example but we also discuss the Huber SVM and present experiments for it in the appendix.
Stochastic Gradient Descent. SGD is a simple but popular optimization algorithm that performs many
incremental gradient updates instead of computing the full gradient of LS . At step t, given wt and a
random example (xt , yt), SGD’s update rule is as follows:
wt+1 = G`t ,ηt (wt) = wt − ηt`′t(wt) (2)
where `t(·) = `(·; (xt , yt)) is the loss function and ηt ∈ R is a parameter called the learning rate, or step size.
We will denote G`t ,ηt as Gt . A form of SGD that is commonly used in practice is permutation-based SGD
(PSGD): first sample a random permutation τ of [m] (m is the size of the training set S), and then repeatedly
apply (2) by cycling through S according to τ . In particular, if we cycle through the dataset k times, it is
called k-pass PSGD.
We now define two important properties of gradient updates that are needed to understand the anal-
ysis of SGD’s convergence in general, as well as our new technical results on differentially private SGD:
expansiveness and boundedness. Specifically, we use these definitions to introduce a simple but important
recent optimization-theoretical result on SGD’s behavior by [21] that we adapt and apply to our problem
setting. Intuitively, expansiveness tells us how much G can expand or contract the distance between two
hypotheses, while boundedness tells us how much G modifies a given hypothesis. We now provide the
formal definitions (due to [29, 31]).
Definition 2 (Expansiveness). Let G :W 7→W be an operator that maps a hypothesis to another hypothesis. G
is said to be ρ-expansive if supw,w′
‖G(w)−G(w′)‖
‖w−w′‖ ≤ ρ.
Definition 3 (Boundedness). Let G :W 7→W be an operator that maps a hypothesis to another hypothesis. G is
said to be σ -bounded if supw∈W ‖G(w)−w‖ ≤ σ.
Lemma 1 (Expansiveness ([29, 31])). Assume that ` is β-smooth. Then, the following hold.
1. If ` is convex, then for any η ≤ 2/β, G`,η is 1-expansive.
2. If ` is γ-strongly convex, then for η ≤ 2β+γ , G`,η is (1− 2ηβγβ+γ )-expansive.
In particular we use the following simplification due to [21].
Lemma 2 ([21]). Suppose that ` is β-smooth and γ-strongly convex. If η ≤ 1β , then G`,η is (1− ηγ)-expansive.
Lemma 3 (Boundedness). Assume that ` is L-Lipschitz. Then the gradient update G`,η is (ηL)-bounded.
We are ready to describe a key quantity studied in this paper.
Definition 4 (δt). Let w0,w1, . . . ,wT , and w′0,w′1, . . . ,w′T be two sequences inW . We define δt as ‖wt −w′t‖.
The following lemma by Hardt, Recht and Singer [21] bounds δt using expansiveness and boundedness
properties (Lemma 1 and 3).
Lemma 4 (Growth Recursion [21]). Fix any two sequences of updates G1, . . . ,GT and G′1, . . . ,G′T . Let w0 = w′0 and
wt = Gt(wt−1) and w′t = G′t(w′t−1) for t = 1,2, . . . ,T . Then
δ0 = 0, and for 0 < t ≤ T
δt ≤

ρδt−1 Gt = G′t is ρ-expansive.
min(ρ,1)δt−1 + 2σt
Gt and G′t are σt-bounded,
Gt is ρ-expansive.
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Essentially, Lemma 4 is used as a tool to prove “average-case stability” of standard SGD in [21]. We
adapt and apply this result to our problem setting and devise new differentially private SGD algorithms.1
The application is non-trivial because of our unique desiderata but we achieve it by leveraging other recent
important optimization-theoretical results by [34] on the convergence of PSGD. Overall, by synthesizing
and building on these recent results, we are able to prove the convergence of our private SGD algorithms as
well.
Differential Privacy. We say that two datasets S,S ′ are neighboring, denoted by S ∼ S ′ , if they differ on a
single individual’s private value. Recall the following definition:
Definition 5 ((ε,δ)-differential privacy). A (randomized) algorithm A is said to be (ε,δ)-differentially private
if for any neighboring datasets S,S ′ , and any event E ⊆ Range(A), Pr[A(S) ∈ E] ≤ eεPr[A(S ′) ∈ E] + δ.
In particular, if δ = 0, we will use ε-differential privacy instead of (ε,0)-differential privacy. A basic
paradigm to achieve ε-differential privacy is to examine a query’s L2-sensitivity,
Definition 6 (L2-sensitivity). Let f be a deterministic query that maps a dataset to a vector in Rd . The L2-
sensitivity of f is defined to be ∆2(f ) = maxS∼S ′ ‖f (S)− f (S ′)‖.
The following theorem relates ε-differential privacy and L2-sensitivity.
Theorem 1 ([16]). Let f be a deterministic query that maps a database to a vector inRd . Then publishing f (D)+κ
where κ is sampled from the distribution with density
p(κ) ∝ exp
(
− ε‖κ‖
∆2(f )
)
(3)
ensures ε-differential privacy.
For the interested reader, we provide a detailed algorithm in Appendix E for how to sample from the
above distribution.
Importantly, the L2-norm of the noise vector, ‖κ‖, is distributed according to the Gamma distribution
Γ (d,∆2(f )/ε). We have the following fact about Gamma distributions:
Theorem 2 ([13]). For the noise vector κ, we have that with probability at least 1−γ , ‖κ‖ ≤ d ln(d/γ)∆2(f )ε .
Note that the noise depends linearithmically on d. This could destroy utility (lower accuracy dramati-
cally) if d is high. But there are standard techniques to mitigate this issue that are commonly used in private
SGD literature (we discuss more in Section 4.3). By switching to Gaussian noise, we obtain (ε,δ)-differential
privacy.
Theorem 3 ([17]). Let f be a deterministic query that maps a database to a vector in Rd . Let ε ∈ (0,1) be
arbitrary. For c2 > 2ln(1.25/δ), adding Gaussian noise sampled according to
N (0,σ2); σ ≥ c∆2(f )
ε
, c2 > 2ln
(1.25
δ
)
(4)
ensures (ε,δ)-differentially privacy.
For Gaussian noise, the dependency on d is
√
d, instead of d lnd.
Random Projection. Known convergence results of private SGD (in fact private ERM in general) have a
poor dependencies on the dimension d. To handle high dimensions, a useful technique is random projec-
tion [7]. That is, we sample a random linear transformation T from certain distributions and apply T to
each feature point x in the training set, so x is transformed to T x. Note that after this transformation two
neighboring datasets (datasets differing at one data point) remain neighboring, so random projection does
1Interestingly, differential privacy can be viewed as notion of “worst-case stability.” Thus we offer “worst-case stability.”
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not affect our privacy analysis. Further, the theory of random projection will tell “what low dimension”
to project to so that “approximate utility will be preserved.” (in our MNIST experiments the accuracy gap
between original and projected dimension is very small). Thus, for problems with higher dimensions, we
invoke the random projection to “lower” the dimension to achieve small noise and thus better utility, while
preserving privacy.
In our experimental study we apply random projection to one of our datasets (MNIST).
3 Private SGD
We present our differentially private PSGD algorithms and analyze their privacy and convergence guaran-
tees. Specifically, we present a new analysis of the output perturbation method for PSGD. Our new analysis
shows that very little noise is needed to achieve differential privacy. In fact, the resulting private algorithms
have good convergence rates with even one pass over the data. Since output perturbation also uses standard
PSGD algorithm as a black-box, this makes our algorithms attractive for in-RDBMS scenarios.
This section is structured accordingly in two parts. In Section 3.1 we give two main differentially private
algorithms for convex and strongly convex optimization. In Section 3.2 we first prove that these two algo-
rithms are differentially private (Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2), then extend them in various ways (Section 3.2.3),
and finally prove their convergence (Section 3.2.4).
3.1 Algorithms
As we mentioned before, our differentially private PSGD algorithms uses one of the most basic paradigms
for achieving differential privacy – the output perturbation method [16] based on L2-sensitivity (Defini-
tion 6). Specifically, our algorithms are “instantiations” of the output perturbation method where the
L2-sensitivity parameter ∆2 is derived using our new analysis. To describe the algorithms, we assume a
standard permutation-based SGD procedure (denoted as PSGD) which can be invoked as a black-box. To
facilitate the presentation, Table 1 summarizes the parameters.
Symbol Meaning
λ L2-regularization parameter.
L Lipschitz constant.
γ Strong convexity.
β Smoothness.
ε,δ Privacy parameters.
ηt Learning rate or step size at iteration t.
W A convex set that forms the hypothesis space.
R Radius of the hypothesis spaceW .
k Number of passes through the data.
b Mini-batch size of SGD.
m Size of the training set S.
Table 1: Notations.
Algorithms 1 and 2 give our private SGD algorithms for convex and strongly convex cases, respectively.
A key difference between these two algorithms is at line 3 where different L2-sensitivities are used to sample
the noise κ. Note that different learning rates are used: In the convex case, a constant rate is used, while a
decreasing rate 1γt is used in the strongly convex case. Finally, note that the standard PSGD is invoked as a
black box at line 2.
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Algorithm 1 Private Convex Permutation-based SGD
Require: `(·, z) is convex for every z, η ≤ 2/β.
Input: Data S, parameters k,η,ε
1: function PrivateConvexPSGD(S,k,ε,η)
2: w← PSGD(S) with k passes and ηt = η
3: ∆2 ← 2kLη
4: Sample noise vector κ according to (3).
5: return w+κ
Algorithm 2 Private Strongly Convex Permutation-based SGD
Require: `(·, z) is γ-strongly convex for every z
Input: Data S, parameters k,ε
1: function PrivateStronglyConvexPSGD(S,k,ε)
2: w← PSGD(S) with k passes and ηt = min( 1β , 1γt )
3: ∆2 ← 2Lγm
4: Sample noise vector κ according to (3).
5: return w+κ
3.2 Analysis
In this section we investigate privacy and convergence guarantees of Algorithms 1 and 2. Along the way,
we also describe extensions to accommodate common practices in running SGD. Most proofs in this section
are deferred to the appendix.
Overview of the Analysis and Key Observations. For privacy, let A(r;S) denote a randomized non-private
algorithm where r denotes the randomness (e.g., random permutations sampled by SGD) and S denotes
the input training set. To bound L2-sensitivity we want to bound maxr,r ′ ‖A(r;S) − A(r ′ ;S ′)‖ on a pair of
neighboring datasets S,S ′ , where r, r ′ can be different randomness sequences of A in general. This can be
complicated since A(r; ·) and A(r ′ ; ·) may access the data in vastly different patterns.
Our key observation is that for non-adaptive randomized algorithms, it suffices to consider randomness
sequences one at a time, and thus bound maxr ‖A(r;S) −A(r;S ′)‖. This in turn allows us to obtain a small
upper bound of the L2-sensitivity of SGD by combining the expansion properties of gradient operators and
the fact that one will only access once the differing data point between S and S ′ for each pass over the data,
if r is a random permutation.
Finally for convergence, while using permutation benefits our privacy proof, the convergence behavior
of permutation-based SGD is poorly understood in theory. Fortunately, based on very recent advances by
Shamir [34] on the sampling-without-replacement SGD, we prove convergence of our private SGD algo-
rithms even with only one pass over the data.
Randomness One at a Time. Consider the following definition,
Definition 7 (Non-Adaptive Algorithms). A randomized algorithm A is non-adaptive if its random choices do
not depend on the input data values.
PSGD is clearly non-adaptive as a single random permutation is sampled at the very beginning of the
algorithm. Another common SGD variant, where one independently and uniformly samples it ∼ [m] at
iteration t and picks the it-th data point, is also non-adaptive. In fact, more modern SGD variants, such as
Stochastic Variance Reduced Gradient (SVRG [26]) and Stochastic Average Gradient (SAG [32]), are non-
adaptive as well. Now we have the following lemma for non-adaptive algorithms and differential privacy.
Lemma 5. Let A(r;S) be a non-adaptive randomized algorithm where r denotes the randomness of the algorithm
and S denotes the dataset A works on. Suppose that
sup
S∼S ′
sup
r
‖A(r;S)−A(r;S ′)‖ ≤ ∆.
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Then publishing A(r;S) +κ where κ is sampled with density p(κ) ∝ exp
(
− ε‖κ‖2∆
)
ensures ε-differential privacy.
Proof. Let A˜ denote the private version of A. A˜ has two parts of randomness: One part is r, which is used to
compute A(r;S); the second part is κ, which is used for perturbation (i.e. A(r;S) +κ). Let R be the random
variable corresponding to the randomness of A. Note that R does not depend on the input training set.
Thus for any event E,
Pr[A˜((r,κ);S) ∈ E]
=
∑
r
Pr[R = r] ·Pr
κ
[A((r,κ);S) ∈ E | R = r]. (5)
Denote Prκ[A((r,κ);S) ∈ E | R = r] by pκ(Ar (S) ∈ E). Then similarly for S ′ we have that
Pr[A˜((r,κ);S ′) ∈ E]
=
∑
r
Pr[R = r] · pκ(Ar (S ′) ∈ E). (6)
Compare (5) and (6) term by term (for every r): the lemma then follows as we calibrate the noise κ so that
pκ(Ar (S) ∈ E) ≤ eεpκ(Ar (S ′) ∈ E).
From now on we denote PSGD by A. With the notations in Definition 4, our next goal is thus to bound
supS∼S ′ supr δT . In the next two sections we bound this quantity for convex and strongly convex optimiza-
tion, respectively.
3.2.1 Convex Optimization
In this section we prove privacy guarantee when `(·, z) is convex. Recall that for general convex optimiza-
tion, we have 1-expansiveness by Lemma 1.1. We thus have the following lemma that bounds δT .
Lemma 6. Consider k-passes PSGD for L-Lipschitz, convex and β-smooth optimization where ηt ≤ 2β for t =
1, . . . ,T . Let S,S i be any neighboring datasets. Let r be a random permutation of [m]. Suppose that r(i) = i∗. Let
T = km, then δT ≤ 2L∑k−1j=0 ηi∗+jm .
We immediately have the following corollary on L2-sensitivity with constant step size,
Corollary 1 (Constant Step Size). Consider k-passes PSGD for L-Lipschitz, convex and β-smooth optimization.
Suppose further that we have constant learning rate η1 = η2 = · · · = ηT = η ≤ 2β . Then supS∼S ′ supr δT ≤ 2kLη.
This directly yields the following theorem,
Theorem 4. Algorithm 1 is ε-differentially private.
We now give L2-sensitivity results for two different choices of step sizes, which are also common for
convex optimization.
Corollary 2 (Decreasing Step Size). Let c ∈ [0,1) be some constant. Consider k-passes PSGD for L-Lipschitz,
convex and β-smooth optimization. Suppose further that we take decreasing step size ηt = 2β(t+mc) where m is the
training set size. Then supS∼S ′ supr δT = 4Lβ
(
1
mc +
lnk
m
)
.
Corollary 3 (Square-Root Step Size). Let c ∈ [0,1) be some constant. Consider k-passes PSGD for L-Lipschitz,
convex and β-smooth optimization. Suppose further that we take square-root step size ηt = 2β(
√
t+mc)
. Then
sup
S∼S ′
sup
r
δT ≤4Lβ
k−1∑
j=0
1√
jm+ 1 +mc

=O
Lβ
 1mc + min
 kmc ,
√
k
m
 .
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Remark on Constant Step Size. In Lemma 1 the step size is named “constant” for the SGD. However, one
should note that Constant step size for SGD can depend on the size of the training set, and in particular
can vanish to zero as training set size m increases. For example, a typical setting of step size is 1√
m
(In fact,
in typical convergence results of SGD, see, for example in [12, 28], the constant step size η is set to 1/T O(1)
where T is the total number of iterations). This, in particular, implies a sensitivityO(kη) =O(k/
√
m), which
vanishes to 0 as m grows to infinity.
3.2.2 Strongly Convex Optimization
Now we consider the case where `(·, z) is γ-strongly convex. In this case the sensitivity is smaller because
the gradient operators are ρ-expansive for ρ < 1 so in particular they become contractions. We have the
following lemmas.
Lemma 7 (Constant Step Size). Consider PSGD for L-Lipschitz, γ-strongly convex and β-smooth optimization
with constant step sizes η ≤ 1β . Let k be the number of passes. Let S,S ′ be two neighboring datasets differing
at the i-th data point. Let r be a random permutation of [m]. Suppose that r(i) = i∗. Let T = km, then δT ≤
2Lη
∑k−1
j=0(1− ηγ)(k−j)m−i
∗
. In particular,
sup
S∼S ′
sup
r
δT ≤ 2ηL1− (1− ηγ)m .
Lemma 8 (Decreasing Step Size). Consider k-passes PSGD for L-Lipschitz, γ-strongly convex and β-smooth op-
timization. Suppose further that we use decreasing step length: ηt = min( 1γt ,
1
β ). Let S,S
′ be two neighboring
datasets differing at the i-th data point. Let r be a random permutation of [m]. Suppose that r(i) = i∗. Let T = km,
then supS∼S ′ supr δT ≤ 2Lγm .
In particular, Lemma 8 yields the following theorem,
Theorem 5. Algorithm 2 is ε-differentially private.
One should contrast this theorem with Theorem 4: In the convex case we bound L2-sensitivity by 2kLη,
while in the strongly convex case we bound it by 2L/γm.
3.2.3 Extensions
In this section we extend our main argument in several ways: (ε,δ)-differential privacy, mini-batching,
model averaging, fresh permutation at each pass, and finally constrained optimization. These extensions
can be easily incorporated to standard PSGD algorithm, as well as our private algorithms 1 and 2, and are
used in our empirical study later.
(ε,δ)-Differential Privacy. We can also obtain (ε,δ)-differential privacy easily using Gaussian noise (see
Theorem 3).
Lemma 9. Let A(r;S) be a non-adaptive randomized algorithm where r denotes the randomness of the algorithm
and S denote the dataset. Suppose that
sup
S∼S ′
sup
r
‖A(r;S)−A(r;S ′)‖ ≤ ∆.
Then for any ε ∈ (0,1), publishing A(r;S) + κ where each component of κ is sampled using (4) ensures (ε,δ)-
differential privacy.
In particular, combining this with our L2-sensitivity results, we get the following two theorems,
Theorem 6 (Convex and Constant Step). Algorithm 1 is (ε,δ)-differentially private if each component of κ at
line 3 is sampled according to equation (4).
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Theorem 7 (Strongly Convex and Decreasing Step). Algorithm 2 is (ε,δ)-differentially private if each compo-
nent of κ at line 3 is sampled according to equation (4).
Mini-batching. A popular way to do SGD is that at each step, instead of sampling a single data point zt
and do gradient update w.r.t. it, we randomly sample a batch B ⊆ [m] of size b, and do
wt = wt−1 − ηt 1b
∑
i∈B
`′i(wt−1)
 = 1b∑
i∈B
Gi(wt−1).
For permutation SGD, a natural way to employ mini-batch is to partition the m data points into mini-
batches of size b (for simplicity let us assume that b divides m), and do gradient updates with respect to
each chunk. In this case, we notice that mini-batch indeed improves the sensitivity by a factor of b. In fact,
let us consider neighboring datasets S,S ′ , and at step t, we have batches B,B′ that differ in at most one data
point. Without loss of generality, let us consider the case where B,B′ differ at one data point, then on S we
have wt =
1
b
∑
i∈BGi(wt−1), and on S ′ we have w′t = 1b
∑
i∈BG′i(w
′
t−1), and so
δt =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥1b∑i∈B Gi(wt−1)−G′i(w′t−1)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤1
b
B∑
i=1
‖Gi(wt−1)−G′i(w′t−1)‖.
We note that for all i except one in B, Gi = G′i , and so by the Growth Recursion Lemma 4, ‖Gi(wt−1) −
G′i(w
′
t−1)‖ ≤ ρδt−1 if Gi is ρ-expansive, and for the differing index i∗, ‖Gi∗(wt−1)−G′i∗(w′t−1)‖ ≤min(ρ,1)δt−1 +
2σt . Therefore, for a uniform bound ρt on expansiveness and σt on boundedness (for all i ∈ B, which is
the case in our analysis), we have that δt ≤ ρtδt−1 + 2σtb . This implies a factor b improvement for all our
sensitivity bounds.
Model Averaging. Model averaging is a popular technique for SGD. For example, given iterates w1, . . . ,wT ,
a common way to do model averaging is either to output 1T
∑T
t=1wt or output the average of the last logT
iterates. We show that model averaging will not affect our sensitivity result, and in fact it will give a
constant-factor improvement when earlier iterates have smaller sensitivities. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 10 (Model Averaging). Suppose that instead of returning wT at the end of the optimization, we return
an averaged model w¯ =
∑T
t=1αtwt , where αt is a sequence of coefficients that only depend on t,T . Then,
sup
S∼S ′
sup
r
‖w¯ − w¯′‖ ≤
T∑
t=1
αt‖wt −w′t‖ =
T∑
t=1
αtδt .
In particular, we notice that the δt’s we derived before are non-decreasing, so the sensitivity is bounded by
(
∑T
t=1αt)δT .
Fresh Permutation at Each Pass. We note that our analysis extends verbatim to the case where in each pass
a new permutation is sampled, as our analysis applies to any fixed permutation.
Constrained Optimization. Until now, our SGD algorithm is for unconstrained optimization. That is,
the hypothesis space W is the entire Rd . Our results easily extend to constrained optimization where the
hypothesis spaceW is a convex set C. That is, our goal is to compute minw∈C LS (w). In this case, we change
the original gradient update rule 2 to the projected gradient update rule:
wt =
∏
C
(
wt−1 − ηt`′t(wt−1)
)
, (7)
where
∏
C(w) = argminv ‖v −w‖ is the projection of w to C. It is easy to see that our analysis carries over
verbatim to the projected gradient descent. In fact, our analysis works as long as the optimization is carried
over a Hilbert space (i.e., the ‖ · ‖ is induced by some inner product). The essential reason is that projection
will not increase the distance (‖∏u −∏v‖ ≤ ‖u − v‖), and thus will not affect our sensitivity argument.
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3.2.4 Convergence of Optimization
We now bound the optimization error of our private PSGD algorithms. More specifically, we bound the
excess empirical risk LS (w)−L∗S where LS (w) is the loss of the output w of our private SGD algorithm and L∗S
is the minimum obtained by any w in the feasible setW . Note that in PSGD we sample data points without
replacement. While sampling without replacement benefits our L2-sensitivity argument, its convergence
behavior is poorly understood in theory. Our results are based on very recent advances by Shamir [34] on
the sampling-without-replacement SGD.
As in Shamir [34], we assume that the loss function `i takes the form of `i(〈w,xi〉)+ r(w) where r is some
fixed function. Further we assume that the optimization is carried over a convex set C of radius R (i.e.,
‖w‖ ≤ R for w ∈ C). We use projected PSGD algorithm (i.e., we use the projected gradient update rule 7).
Finally, R(T ) is a regret bound if for any w ∈W and convex-Lipschitz `1, . . . , `T , ∑Tt=1 `t(wt)−∑Tt=1 `t(w) ≤
R(T ) and R(T ) is sublinear in T . We use the following regret bound,
Theorem 8 (Zinkevich [38]). For SGD with constant step size η1 = η2 = · · · = ηT = η, R(T ) is bounded by
R2
2η +
L2T η
2 .
The following lemma is useful in bounding excess empirical risk.
Lemma 11 (Risk due to Privacy). Consider L-Lipschitz and β-smooth optimization. Let w be the output of the
non-private SGD algorithm, κ be the noise of the output perturbation, and w˜ = w+κ. Then LS (w)−LS (w˜) ≤ L‖κ‖.
ε-Differential Privacy. We now give convergence result for SGD with ε-differential privacy.
Convex Optimization. If `(·, z) is convex, we use the following theorem from Shamir [34],
Theorem 9 (Corollary 1 of Shamir [34]). Let T ≤m (that is we take at most 1-pass over the data). Suppose that
each iterate wt is chosen fromW , and the SGD algorithm has regret bound R(T ), and that supt,w∈W |`t(w)| ≤ R,
and ‖w‖ ≤ R for all w ∈ W . Finally, suppose that each loss function `t takes the form ¯`(〈w,xt〉) + r(w) for some
L-Lipschitz ¯`(·,xt) and ‖xt‖ ≤ 1, and a fixed r, then
E
 1T
T∑
t=1
LS (wt)−LS (w∗)
 ≤ R(T )T + 2(12 +
√
2L)R√
m
.
Together with Theorem 8, we thus have the following lemma,
Lemma 12. Consider the same setting as in Theorem 9, and 1-pass PSGD optimization defined according to
rule (7). Suppose further that we have constant learning rate η = R
L
√
m
. Finally, let w¯m be the model averaging
1
m
∑T
t=1wt . Then,
E[LS (w¯T )−L∗S ] ≤
(L+ 2(12 +
√
L))R√
m
.
Now we can bound the excess empirical risk as follows,
Theorem 10 (Convex and Constant Step Size). Consider the same setting as in Lemma 12 where the step size is
constant η = R
L
√
m
. Let w˜ = w¯T +κ be the result of Algorithm 1. Then
E[LS (w˜)−L∗S ] ≤
(L+ (2(12 +
√
L))R√
m
+
2dLR
ε
√
m
.
Note that the term 2dLR
ε
√
m
corresponds to the expectation of L‖κ‖.
Strongly Convex Optimization. If `(·, z) is γ-strongly convex, we instead use the following theorem,
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Theorem 11 (Theorem 3 of Shamir [34]). Suppose W has diameter R, and LS (·) is γ-strongly convex on W .
Assume that each loss function `t takes the for ¯`(〈wt ,xt〉)+r(w) where ‖xi‖ ≤ 1, r(·) is possibly some regularization
term, and each ¯`(·,xt) is L-Lipschitz and β-smooth. Furthermore, suppose supw∈W ‖`′t(w)‖ ≤ G. Then for any
1 < T ≤m, if we run SGD for T iterations with step size ηt = 1/γt, we have
E
 1T
T∑
t=1
LS (wt)−LS (w∗)
 ≤ c · ((L+ βR)2 +G2) logTγT ,
where c is some universal positive constant.
By the same argument as in the convex case, we have,
Theorem 12 (Strongly Convex and Decreasing Step Size). Consider the same setting as in Theorem 11 where the
step size is ηt = 1γt . Consider 1-pass PSGD. Let w¯T be the result of model averaging and w˜ = w¯T +κ be the result
of output perturbation. Then E[LS (w˜)−LS (w∗)] ≤ c · ((L+βR)
2+G2) logm
γm +
2dG2
εγm .
Remark. Our convergence results for ε-differential privacy is different from previous work, such as BST14,
which only give convergence for (ε,δ)-differential privacy for δ > 0. In fact, BST14 relies in an essential way
on the advanced composition of (ε,δ)-differential privacy [17] and we are not aware its convergence for ε-
differential privacy. Note that ε-differential privacy is qualitatively different from (ε,δ)-differential privacy
(see, for example, paragraph 3, pp. 18 in Dwork and Roth [17], as well as a recent article by McSherry [5]).
We believe that our convergence results for ε-differential privacy is important in its own right.
(ε,δ)-Differential Privacy. By replacing Laplace noise with Gaussian noise, we can derive similar conver-
gence results of our algorithms for (ε,δ)-differential privacy for 1-pass SGD.
It is now instructive to compare our convergence results with BST14 for constant number of passes. In
particular, by plugging in different parameters into the analysis of BST14 (in particular, Lemma 2.5 and
Lemma 2.6 in BST14) one can derive variants of their results for constant number of passes. The following
table compares the convergence in terms of the dependencies on the number of training points m, and the
number of dimensions d.
Ours BST14
Convex O
( √
d√
m
)
O
(√
d(log3/2m)√
m
)
Strongly Convex O
(√
d logm
m
)
O
(
d log2m
m
)
Table 2: Convergence for (ε,δ)-DP and constant number of passes.
In particular, in the convex case our convergence is better with a log3/2m factor, and in the strongly
convex case ours is better with a
√
d logm factor. These logarithmic factors are inherent in BST14 due to its
dependence on some optimization results (Lemma 2.5, 2.6 in their paper), which we do not rely on. Therefore,
this comparison gives theoretical evidence that our algorithms converge better for constant number passes. On
the other hand, these logarithmic factors become irrelevant for BST14 with m passes, as the denominator
becomes m in the convex case, and becomes m2 in the strongly case, giving better dependence on m there.
4 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we present a comprehensive empirical study comparing three alternatives for private SGD:
two previously proposed state-of-the-art private SGD algorithms, SCS13 [35] and BST14 [10], and our
algorithms which are instantiations of the output perturbation method with our new analysis.
Our goal is to answer four main questions associated with the key desiderata of in-RDBMS implemen-
tations of private SGD, viz., ease of integration, runtime overhead, scalability, and accuracy:
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1. What is the effort to integrate each algorithm into an in-RDBMS analytics system?
2. What is the runtime overhead and scalability of the private SGD implementations?
3. How does the test accuracy of our algorithms compare to SCS13 and BST14?
4. How do various parameters affect the test accuracy?
As a summary, our main findings are the following: (i) Our SGD algorithms require almost no changes to
Bismarck, while both SCS13 and BST14 require deeper code changes. (ii) Our algorithms incur virtually
no runtime overhead, while SCS13 and BST14 run much slower. Our algorithms scale linearly with the
dataset size. While SCS13 and BST14 also enjoy linear scalability, the runtime overhead they incur also
increases linearly. (iii) Under the same differential privacy guarantees, our private SGD algorithms yield
substantially better accuracy than SCS13 and BST14, for all datasets and settings of parameters we test.
(iv) As for the effects of parameters, our empirical results align well with the theory. For example, as one
might expect, mini-batch sizes are important for reducing privacy noise. The number of passes is more
subtle. For our algorithm, if the learning task is only convex, more passes result in larger noise (e.g., see
Lemma 1), and so give rise to potentially worse test accuracy. On the other hand, if the learning task is
strongly convex, the number of passes will not affect the noise magnitude (e.g., see Lemma 8). As a result,
doing more passes may lead to better convergence and thus potentially better test accuracy. Interestingly,
we note that slightly enlarging mini-batch size can reduce noise very effectively so it is affordable to run
our private algorithms for more passes to get better convergence in the convex case. This corroborates the
results of [35] that mini-batches are helpful in private SGD settings.
In the rest of this section we give more details of our evaluation. Our discussion is structured as follows:
In Section 4.1 we first discuss the implemented algorithms. In particular, we discuss how we modify SCS13
and BST14 to make them better fit into our experiments. We also give some remarks on other relevant
previous algorithms, and on parameter tuning. Then in Section 4.2 we discuss the effort of integrating
different algorithms into Bismarck. Next Section 4.3 discusses the experimental design and datasets for
runtime overhead, scalability and test accuracy. Then in Section 4.4, we report runtime overhead and
scalability results. We report test accuracy results for various datasets and parameter settings, and discuss
the effects of parameters in Section 4.5. Finally, we discuss the lessons we learned from our experiments 4.6.
4.1 Implemented Algorithms
We first discuss implementations of our algorithms, SCS13 and BST14. Importantly, we extend both SCS13
and BST14 to make them better fit into our experiments. Among these extensions, probably most impor-
tantly, we extend BST14 to support a smaller number of iterations through the data and reduce the amount
of noise needed for each iteration. Our extension makes BST14 more competitive in our experiments.
Our Algorithms. We implement Algorithms 1 and 2 with the extensions of mini-batching and constrained
optimization (see Section 3.2.3). Note that Bismarck already supports standard PSGD algorithm with mini-
batching and constrained optimization. Therefore the only change we need to make for Algorithms 1 and 2
(note that the total number of updates is T = km) is the setting of L2-sensitivity parameter ∆2 at line 3 of
respective algorithms, which we divide by b if the mini-batch size is b.
SCS13 [35]. We modify [35], which originally only supports one pass through the data, to support multi-
passes over the data.
BST14 [10]. BST14 provides a second solution for private SGD following the same paradigm as SCS13, but
with less noise per iteration. This is achieved by first, using a novel subsampling technique and second,
relaxing the privacy guarantee to (ε,δ)-differential privacy for δ > 0. This relaxation is necessary as they
need to use advanced composition results for (ε,δ)-differential privacy.
However, the original BST14 algorithm needs O(m2) iterations to finish, which is prohibitive for even
moderate sized datasets. We extend it to support cm iterations for some constant c. Reducing the num-
ber of iterations means that potentially we can reduce the amount of noise for privacy because data is “less
examined.” This is indeed the case: One can go through the same proof in [10] with a smaller number of
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iterations, and show that each iteration only needs a smaller amount of noise than before (unfortunately
this does not give convergence results). Our extension makes BST14 more competitive. In fact it yields sig-
nificantly better test accuracy compared to the case where one naı¨vely stops BST14 after c passes, but the
noise magnitude in each iteration is the same as in the original paper [10] (which is for m passes). The ex-
tended BST14 algorithms are given in Algorithm 4 and 5. Finally, we also make straightforward extensions
so that BST14 supports mini-batching.
Other Related Work. We also note the work of Jain, Kothari and Thakurta [24] which is related to our
setting. In particular their Algorithm 6 is similar to our private SGD algorithm in the setting of strong
convexity and (ε,δ)-differential privacy. However, we note that their algorithm uses Implicit Gradient
Descent (IGD), which belongs to proximal algorithms (see for example Parikh and Boyd [30]) and is known
to be more difficult to implement than stochastic gradient methods. Due to this consideration, in this study
we will not compare empirically with this algorithm. Finally, we also note that [24] also has an SGD-style
algorithm (Algorithm 3) for strongly convex optimization and (ε,δ)-differential privacy. This algorithm
adds noise comparable to our algorithm at each step of the optimization, and thus we do not compare with
it either.
Private Parameter Tuning. We observe that for all SGD algorithms considered, it may be desirable to fine
tune some parameters to achieve the best performance. For example, if one chooses to do L2-regularization,
then it is customary to tune the parameter λ. We note that under the theme of differential privacy, such
parameter tunings must also be done privately. To the best of our knowledge however, no previous work
have evaluated the effect of private parameter tuning for SGD. Therefore we take the natural step to fill in
this gap. We note that there are two possible ways to do this.
Tuning using Public Data. Suppose that one has access to a public data set, which is assumed to be drawn
from the same distribution as the private data set. In this case, one can use standard methods to tune SGD
parameters, and apply the parameters to the private data.
Tuning using a Private Tuning Algorithm. When only private data is available, we use a private tuning
algorithm for private parameter tuning. Following the principle on free parameters [22] in experimenting
with differential privacy, we note free parameters λ,ε,δ,R,k,b. For these parameters, ε,δ are specified as
privacy guarantees. Following common practice for constrained optimization (e.g. [35]) we set R = 1λ for
numeric stability. Thus the parameters we need to tune are k,b,λ. We call k,b,λ the tuning parameters. We
use a standard grid search [3] with commonly used values to define the space of parameter values, from
which the tuning algorithm picks values for the parameters to tune.
We use the tuning algorithm described in the original paper of Chaudhuri, Monteleoni and Sarwate [13],
though the methodology and experiments in the following are readily extended to other private tuning
algorithms [14]. Specifically, let θ = (k,b,λ) denote a tuple of the tuning parameters. Given a space Θ =
{θ1, . . . ,θl}, Algorithm 3 gives the details of the tuning algorithm.
Algorithm 3 Private Tuning Algorithm for SGD
Input: Data S, space of tuning parameters Θ = {θ1, . . . ,θl}, privacy parameters ε,δ.
1: function PrivatelyTunedSGD(S,Θ, ε,δ)
2: Divide S into l + 1 equal portions S1, . . . ,Sl+1.
3: For each i ∈ [l], train a hypothesis wi using any algorithm 1 – 5 with training set Si and parameters
θi , ε,δ and R = 1/λ (if needed).
4: Compute the number of classification errors χi made by wi on Sl+1.
5: Pick output hypothesis w = wi with probability
pi =
e−εχi /2∑l
j=1 e
−εχj /2 .
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4.2 Integration with Bismarck
We now explain how we integrate private SGD algorithms in RDBMS. To begin with, we note that the state-
of-the-art way to do in-RDBMS data analysis is via the User Defined Aggregates (UDA) offered by almost
all RDBMSes [20]. Using UDAs enables scaling to larger-than-memory datasets seamlessly while still being
fast.2 A well-known open source implementation of the UDAs required is Bismarck [19]. Bismarck achieves
high performance and scalability through a unified architecture of in-RDBMS data analytics systems using
the permutation-based SGD.
Therefore, we use Bismarck to experiment with private SGD inside RDBMS. Specifically, we use Bismarck
on top of PostgreSQL, which implements the UDA for SGD in C to provide high runtime efficiency. Our
results carry over naturally to any other UDA-based implementation of analytics in an RDBMS. The rest
of this section is organized as follows. We first describe Bismarck’s system architecture. We then compare
the system extensions and the implementation effort needed for integrating our private PSGD algorithm as
well as SCS13 and BST14.
Dataset Table
Shuffle
Initialize
Transition
Terminate
Converged w w′
(A) → [Regular Bismarck]
No
Yes (B) Noise [Ours]
(C) Noise [SCS13, BST14]
Figure 1: (A) System architecture of regular Bismarck. (B) Extension to implement our algorithms. (C)
Extension to implement any of SCS13 and BST14.
Figure 1 (A) gives an overview of Bismarck’s architecture. The dataset is stored as a table in PostgreSQL.
Bismarck permutes the table using an SQL query with a shuffling clause, viz., ORDER BY RANDOM(). A pass
(or epoch, which is used more often in practice) of SGD is implemented as a C UDA and this UDA is
invoked with an SQL query for each epoch. A front-end controller in Python issues the SQL queries and
also applies the convergence test for SGD after each epoch. The developer has to provide implementations
of three functions in the UDA’s C API: initialize, transition, and terminate, all of which operate on the
aggregation state, which is the quantity being computed.
To explain how this works, we compare SGD with a standard SQL aggregate: AVG. The state for AVG is the
2-tuple (sum,count), while that for SGD is the model vector w. The function initialize sets (sum,count) =
(0,0) for AVG, while for SGD, it sets w to the value given by the Python controller (the previous epoch’s
output model). The function transition updates the state based on a single tuple (one example). For
example, given a tuple with value x, the state update for AVG is as follows: (sum,count) += (x,1). For SGD,
x is the feature vector and the update is the update rule for SGD with the gradient on x. If mini-batch SGD
is used, the updates are made to a temporary accumulated gradient that is part of the aggregation state
along with counters to track the number of examples and mini-batches seen so far. When a mini-batch
is over, the transition function updates w using the accumulated gradient for that mini-batch using an
appropriate step size. The function terminate computes sum/count and outputs it for AVG, while for SGD,
it simply returns w at the end of that epoch.
2The MapReduce abstraction is similar to an RDBMS UDA [1]. Thus our implementation ideas apply to MapReduce-based systems as well.
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It is easy to see that our private SGD algorithm requires almost no change to Bismarck – simply add noise
to the final w output after all epochs, as illustrated in Figure 1 (B). Thus, our algorithm does not modify any
of the RDBMS-related C UDA code. In fact, we were able to implement our algorithm in about 10 lines of
code (LOC) in Python within the front-end Python controller. In contrast, both SCS13 and BST14 require
deeper changes to the UDA’s transition function because they need to add noise at the end of each mini-
batch update. Thus, implementing them required adding dozens of LOC in C to implement their noise
addition procedure within the transition function, as illustrated in Figure 1 (C). Furthermore, Python’s
scipy library already provides the sophisticated distributions needed for sampling the noise (gamma and
multivariate normal), which our algorithm’s implementation exploits. But for both SCS13 and BST14, we
need to implement some of these distributions in C so that it can be used in the UDA.3
4.3 Experimental Method and Datasets
We now describe our experimental method and datasets.
Test Scenarios. We consider four main scenarios to evaluate the algorithms: (1) Convex, ε-differential
privacy, (2) Convex, (ε,δ)-differential privacy, (3) Strongly Convex, ε-differential privacy, and finally (4)
Strongly Convex, (ε,δ)-differential privacy. Note that BST14 only supports (ε,δ)-differential privacy. Thus
for tests (1) and (3) we compare non-private algorithm, our algorithms, and SCS13. For tests (2) and (4),
we compare non-private algorithm, our algorithms, SCS13 and BST14. For each scenario, we train models
on test datasets and measure the test accuracy of the resulting models. We evaluate both logistic regression
and Huber support vector machine (Huber SVM) (due to lack of space, the results on Huber SVM are put to
Section B). We use the standard logistic regression for the convex case (Tests (1) and (2)), and L2-regularized
logistic regression for the strongly convex case (Tests (3) and (4)). We now give more details.
Dataset Task Train Size Test Size #Dimensions
MNIST 10 classes 60000 10000 784 (50) [∗]
Protein Binary 72876 72875 74
Forest Binary 498010 83002 54
Table 3: Datasets. Each row gives the name of the dataset, number of classes in the classification task,
sizes of training and test sets, and finally the number of dimensions. [∗]: For MNIST, it originally has 784
dimensions, which is difficult for ε-differential privacy as sampling from (3) makes the magnitude of noise
depends linearly on the number of dimensions d. Therefore we randomly project it to 50 dimensions. All
data points are normalized to the unit sphere.
Datasets. We consider three standard benchmark datasets: MNIST4, Protein5, and Forest Covertype6.
MNIST is a popular dataset used for image classification. MNIST poses a challenge to differential privacy
for three reasons: (1) Its number of dimensions is relatively higher than others. To get meaningful test
accuracy we thus use Gaussian Random Projection to randomly project to 50 dimensions. This random
projection only incurs very small loss in test accuracy, and thus the performance of non-private SGD on
50 dimensions will serve the baseline. (2) MNIST is of medium size and differential privacy is known to
be more difficult for medium or small sized datasets. (3) MNIST is a multiclass classification (there are 10
digits), we built “one-vs.-all” multiclass logitstic regression models. This means that we need to construct
10 binary models (one for each digit). Therefore, one needs to split the privacy budget across sub-models.
We used the simplest composition theorem [17], and divide the privacy budget evenly.
For Protein dataset, because its test dataset does not have labels, we randomly partition the training set
into halves to form train and test datasets. Logistic regression models have very good test accuracy on it.
Finally, Forest Covertype is a large dataset with 581012 data points, almost 6 times larger than previous
3One could use the Python-based UDAs in PostgreSQL but that incurs a significant runtime performance penalty compared to C UDAs.
4http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/.
5http://osmot.cs.cornell.edu/kddcup/datasets.html.
6https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Covertype.
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ones. We split it to have 498010 training points and 83002 test points. We use this large dataset for two
purposes: First, in this case, one may expect that privacy will follow more easily. We test to what degree
this holds for different private algorithms. Second, since training on such large datasets is time consuming,
it is desirable to use it to measure runtime overheads of various private algorithms.
Settings of Hyperparameters. The following describes how hyperparameters are set in our experiments.
There are three classes of parameters: Loss function parameters, privacy parameters, and parameters for
running stochastic gradient descent.
Loss Function Parameters. Given the loss function and L2 regularization parameter λ, we can derive L,β,γ
as described in Section 2. We privately tune λ in {0.0001,0.001,0.01}.
Privacy Parameters. ε,δ are privacy parameters. We vary ε in {0.1,0.2,0.5,1,2,4} for MNIST, and in
{0.01,0.02,0.05,0.1,0.2,
0.4} for Protein and Covertype (as they are binary classification problems and we do not need to divide by
10). δ is set to be 1/m2 where m is the size of the training set size.
SGD Parameters. Now we consider ηt , b, and k.
Step Size ηt . Step sizes are derived from theoretical analyses of SGD algorithms. In particular the step sizes
only depend on the loss function parameters and the time stamp t during SGD. Table 4 summarizes step
sizes for different settings.
Non-private Ours SCS13 BST14
C + ε-DP 1√
m
1√
m
1√
t
×
C + (ε,δ)-DP 1√
m
1√
m
1√
t
Alg. 4
SC + ε-DP 1γt min(
1
β ,
1
γt )
1√
t
×
SC + (ε,δ)-DP 1γt min(
1
β ,
1
γt )
1√
t
Alg. 5
Table 4: Step Sizes for different settings. C: Convex, SC: Strongly Convex. For SCS13 we follow in[35] and
set step size to be 1/
√
t.
Mini-batch Size b. We are not aware of a first-principled way in literature to set mini-batch size (note that
convergence proofs hold even for b = 1). In practice mini-batch size typically depends on the system con-
straints (e.g. number of CPUs) and is set to some number from 10 to 100. We set b = 50 in our experiments
for fair comparisons with SCS13 and BST14, which shows that our algorithms enjoy both efficiency and
substantially better test accuracy.
Note that increasing b could reduce noise but makes the gradient step more expensive and might require
more passes. In general, a good practice is to set b to be reasonably large without hurting performance too
much. To assess the impact of this setting further, we include an experiment on varying the batch size in
Appendix D. We leave for future work the deeper questions on formally identifying the sweet spot among
efficiency, noise, and accuracy.
Number of Passes k. For fair comparisons in the experiments below with SCS13 and BST14, for all algo-
rithms tested we privately tune k in {5,10}. However, for our algorithms there is a simpler strategy to set k
in the strongly convex case. Since our algorithms run vanilla SGD as a black box, one can set a convergence
tolerance threshold µ and set a large K as the threshold on the number of passes. Since in the strongly
convex case the noise injected in our algorithms (Alg. 2) does not depend on k, we can run the vanilla SGD
until either the decrease rate of training error is smaller than µ, or the number of passes reaches K , and
inject noise at the end.
Note that this strategy does not work for SCS13 or BST14 because in either convex or strongly convex
case, their noise injected in each step depends on k, so they must have k fixed beforehand. Moreover, since
they inject noise at each SGD iteration, it is likely that they will run out of the pass threshold.
The above discussion demonstrates an additional advantage of our algorithms using output perturbation:
In the strongly convex case the number of passes k is oblivious to private SGD.
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Radius R. Recall that for strongly convex optimization the hypothesis space needs to a have bounded norm
(due to the use of L2 regularization). We adopt the practices in [35] and set R = 1/λ.
Experimental Environment. All the experiments were run on a machine with Intel Xeon E5-2680 2.50GHz
CPUs (48-core) and 64GB RAM running Ubuntu 14.04.4.
4.4 Runtime Overhead and Scalability
Using output perturbation trivially addresses runtime and scalability concerns. We confirm this experi-
mentally in this section.
Runtime Overheads. We compare the runtime overheads of our private SGD algorithms against the noise-
less version and the other algorithms. The key parameters that affect runtimes are the number of epochs
and the batch sizes. Thus, we vary each of these parameters, while fixing the others. The runtimes are
the average of 4 warm-cache runs and all datasets fit in the buffer cache of PostgreSQL. The error bars
represent 90% confidence intervals. The results are plotted in Figure 5 (a)–(c) and Figure 5 (d)–(f) (only the
results of strongly convex, (ε,δ)-differential privacy are reported; the other results are similar and thus, we
skip them here for brevity).
The first observation is that our algorithm incurs virtually no runtime overhead over noiseless Bismarck,
which is as expected because our algorithm only adds noise once at the end of all epochs. In contrast, both
SCS13 and BST14 incur significant runtime overheads in all settings and datasets. In terms of runtime
performance for 20 epochs and a batch size of 10, both SCS13 and BST14 are between 2X and 3X slower
than our algorithm. The gap grows larger as the batch size is reduced: for a batch size of 1 and 1 epoch, both
SCS13 and BST14 are up to 6X slower than our algorithm. This is expected since these algorithms invoke
expensive random sampling code from sophisticated distributions for each mini-batch. When the batch
size is increased to 500, the runtime gap between these algorithms practically disappears as the random
sampling code is invoked much less often. Overall, we find that our algorithms can be significantly faster
than the alternatives.
Scalability. We compare the runtimes of all the private SGD algorithms as the datasets are scaled up in
size (number of examples). For this experiment, we use the data synthesizer available in Bismarck for binary
classification. We produce two sets of datasets for scalability: in-memory and disk-based (dataset does not fit
in memory). The results for both are presented in Figure 2. We observe linear increase in runtimes for all the
algorithms compared in both settings. As expected, when the dataset fits in memory, SCS13 and BST14 are
much slower and in particular the runtime overhead increases linearly as data size grows. This is primarily
because CPU costs dominate the runtime. Recall that these algorithms add noise to each mini-batch, which
makes them computationally more expensive. We also see that all runtimes scale linearly with the dataset
size even in the disk-based setting. An interesting difference is that I/O costs, which are the same for all
the algorithms compared, dominate the runtime in Figure 2(b). Overall, these results demonstrate a key
benefit of integrating our private SGD algorithm into an RDBMS-based toolkit like Bismarck: scalability to
larger-than-memory data comes for free.
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Figure 2: Scalability of (,δ)-DP SGD algorithms in Bismarck: (a) The dataset fits in memory. (b) The
dataset is larger than memory (on disk). The runtime per epoch for mini-batch size = 1 is plotted. All
datasets have d = 50 features. We fix  = 0.1 and λ = 0.0001. The dataset sizes vary from 3.7 GB to 18.6
GB in (a) and from 149 GB to 447 GB in (b).
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4.5 Accuracy and Effects of Parameters
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Figure 3: Tuning using Public Data. Row 1 is MNIST, row 2 is Protein and row 3 is Forest Covertype. Each
row gives the test accuracy results of 4 tests: Test 1 is Convex, (ε,0)-DP, Test 2 is Convex, (ε,δ)-DP, Test 3 is
Strongly Convex, (ε,0)-DP, and Test 4 is Strongly Convex, (ε,δ)-DP. For Test 1 and 3, we compare Noiseless,
our algorithm and SCS13. For Test 2 and 4, we compare all four algorithms. The mini-batch size b = 50.
For strongly convex optimization we set R = 1/λ, otherwise we report unconstrained optimization for the
convex case. Each point is the test accuracy of the model trained with 10 passes and λ = 0.0001, where
applicable.
Finally, we report test accuracy and analyze the parameters.
Test Accuracy using Public Data. Figure 3 reports the test accuracy results if one can tune parameters
using public data. For all tests our algorithms give significantly better accuracy, up to 4X better than SCS13 and
BST14. Besides better absolute performance, we note that our algorithms are more stable in the sense that
it converges more quickly to noiseless performance (at smaller ε).
Test Accuracy using a Private Tuning Algorithm. Figure 6 gives the test accuracy results of MNIST, Protein
and Covertype for all 4 test scenarios using a private tuning algorithm (Algorithm 3). For all tests we see that
our algorithms give significantly better accuracy, up to 3.5X better than BST14 and up to 3X better than SCS13.
SCS13 and BST14 exhibit much better accuracy on Protein than on MNIST, since logistic regression fits
well to the problem. Specifically, BST14 has very close accuracy as our algorithms, though our algorithms
still consistently outperform BST14. The accuracy of SCS13 decreases significantly with smaller ε.
For Covertype, even on this large dataset, SCS13 and BST14 give much worse accuracy compared to
ours. The accuracy of our algorithms is close to the baseline at around ε = 0.05. The accuracy of SCS13 and
BST14 slowly improves with more passes over the data. Specifically, the accuracy of BST14 approaches the
baseline only after ε = 0.4.
Number of Passes (Epochs). In the case of convex optimization, more passes through the data indicates
larger noise magnitude according to our theory results. This translates empirically to worse test accuracy
as we perform more passes. Figure 4 (a) reports test accuracy in the convex case as we run our algorithm 1
pass, 10 passes and 20 passes through the MNIST data. The accuracy drops from 0.71 to 0.45 for ε = 4.0.
One should contrast this with results reported in Figure 4 (b) where doing more passes actually improves
the test accuracy. This is because in the strongly convex case more passes will not introduce more noise for
privacy while it can potentially improve the convergence.
Mini-batch Sizes. We find that slightly enlarging the mini-batch size can effectively reduce the noise and
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(b) Strongly Convex, Test 3
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Figure 4: (a), (b) The effect of number of passes: We report the results on MNIST dataset. We contrast
Test 1 (Convex ε-DP) using mini-batch size 1, with Test 3 (Strongly Convex ε-DP) using mini-batch size 50.
In the former case, more passes through the data introduces more noise due to privacy and thus results in
worse test accuracy. In the latter case, more passes improves the test accuracy as it helps convergence while
no more noise is needed for privacy. (c) The effect of mini-batch size. We run again Test 1 with 20 passes
through the data, and vary mini-batch size in {1,10,50}. As soon as mini-batch size increases to 10 the test
accuracy drastically improves from 0.45 to 0.71.
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Figure 5: Runtime of the implementations on Bismarck. Row 1 gives the runtime results of varying the
number of epochs with mini-batch size = 10, on MNIST, Protein and Forest Covertype, respectively. Row 2
gives the runtime results of Varying the mini-batch size for a single epoch, on MNIST, Protein and Forest
Covertype, respectively. Only the results of Strongly Convex, (ε,δ)-DP are reported, and other settings have
very similar trends. Noiseless is the regular mini-batch SGD in Bismarck. We fix ε = 0.1.
thus allow the private algorithm to run more passes in the convex setting. This is useful since it is very
common in practice to adopt a mini-batch size at around 10 to 50. To illustrate the effect of mini-batch size
we consider the same test as we did above for measuring the effect of number of passes: We run Test 1 with
20 passes through the data, but vary mini-batch sizes in {1,10,50}. Figure 4 (c) reports the test accuracy for
this experiment: As soon as we increase mini-batch size to 10 the test accuracy already improves drastically
from 0.45 to 0.71.
4.6 Lessons from Our Experiments
The experimental results demonstrate that our private SGD algorithms produce much more accurate mod-
els than prior work. Perhaps more importantly, our algorithms are also more stable with small privacy
budgets, which is important for practical applications.
Our algorithms are also easier to tune in practice than SCS13 and BST14. In particular, the only pa-
rameters that one needs to tune for our algorithms are mini-batch size b and L2 regularization parameter
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Figure 6: Tuning using a Private Tuning Algorithm. Row 1 is MNIST, row 2 is Protein and row 3 is
Forest Covertype. Each row gives the test accuracy results of 4 tests: Test 1 is Convex, (ε,0)-DP, Test 2 is
Convex, (ε,δ)-DP, Test 3 is Strongly Convex, (ε,0)-DP, and Test 4 is Strongly Convex, (ε,δ)-DP. For Test 1
and 3, we compare Noiseless, our algorithm and SCS13. For Test 2 and 4, we compare all four algorithms.
The mini-batch size b = 50. For strongly convex optimization we set R = 1/λ, otherwise we unconstrained
optimization for the convex case. The hyper-parameters were tuned using Algorithm 3 with a standard
“grid search” with 2 values for k (5 and 10) and 3 values for λ (0.0001, 0.001, 0.01), where applicable.
λ; other parameters can either be derived from the loss function or can be fixed based on our theoretical
analysis. In contrast, SCS13 and BST14 require more attention to the number of passes k. For b, we rec-
ommend setting it as a value between 50 and 200, noting that too large a value may make gradient steps
more expensive and might require more passes. For λ, we recommend using private parameter tuning with
candidates chosen from a typical range of (10−5,10−2) (e.g., choose {10−5,10−4,10−3,10−2}).
From the larger perspective of building differentially private analytics systems, however, we note that
this paper addresses how to answer one “query” privately and effectively; in some applications, one might
want to answer multiple such queries. Studying tradeoffs such as how to split the privacy budget across
multiple queries is largely orthogonal to our paper’s focus although they are certainly important. Our
work can be plugged into existing frameworks that attempt to address this requirement. That said, we
think there is still a large gap between theory and practice for differentially private analytics systems.
5 Related Work
There has been much prior work on differentially private convex optimization. There are three main
styles of algorithms – output perturbation [10, 13, 24, 33], objective perturbation [13, 27] and online algo-
rithms [10, 15, 24, 35]. Output perturbation works by finding the exact convex minimizer and then adding
noise to it, while objective perturbation exactly solves a randomly perturbed optimization problem. Unfor-
tunately, the privacy guarantees provided by both styles often assume that the exact convex minimizer can
be found, which usually does not hold in practice.
There are also a number of online approaches. [24] provides an online algorithm for strongly convex
optimization based on a proximal algorithm (e.g. Parikh and Boyd [30]), which is harder to implement than
SGD. They also provide an offline version (Algorithm 6) for the strongly convex case that is similar to our
approach. SGD-style algorithms were provided by [10, 15, 24, 35]. There has also been a recent work on
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deep learning (non-convex optimization) with differential privacy [9]. Unfortunately, no convergence result
is known for private non-convex optimization, and they also can only guarantee (ε,δ)-differential privacy
due to the use of advanced composition of (ε,δ)-differential privacy.
Finally, our results are not directly comparable with systems such as RAPPOR [18]. In particular, RAP-
POR assumes a different privacy model (local differential privacy) where there is no trusted centralized
agency who can compute on the entire raw dataset.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Scalable and differentially private convex ERM have each received significant attention in the past decade.
Unfortunately, little previous work has examined the private ERM problem in scalable systems such as
in-RDBMS analytics systems. This paper takes a step to bridge this gap. There are many intriguing future
directions to pursue. We need to better understand the convergence behavior of private SGD when only
a constant number of passes can be afforded. BST14 [10] provides a convergence bound for private SGD
when O(m) passes are made. SCS13 [35] does not provide a convergence proof; however, the work of [15],
which considers local differential privacy, a privacy model where data providers do not even trust the data
collector, can be used to conclude convergence for SCS13, though at a very slow rate. Finally, while our
method converges very well in practice with multiple passes, we can only prove convergence with one pass.
Can we prove convergence bounds of our algorithms for multiple-passes and match the bounds of BST14?
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Figure 7: Tuning using a Private Tuning Algorithm for Huber SVM. Row 1 is MNIST, row 2 is Protein and
row 3 is Forest Covertype. Each row gives the test accuracy results for 4 tests: Test 1 is Convex, (ε,0)-DP,
Test 2 is Convex, (ε,δ)-DP, Test 3 is Strongly Convex, (ε,0)-DP, and Test 4 is Strongly Convex, (ε,δ)-DP. We
compare Noiseless, our algorithms and SCS13 for tests 1 and 3, and compare all four algorithms for tests 2
and 4. The mini-batch size b = 50, and h = 0.1 for the Huber loss. For strongly convex optimization, we set
R = 1/λ, otherwise we report unconstrained optimization in the convex case. The hyper-parameters were
tuned using Algorithm 3 with a standard “grid search” with 2 values for k (5 and 10) and 3 values for λ
(0.0001, 0.001, 0.01), where applicable.
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Figure 8: More Accuracy Results of Tuning using Public Data. Row 1 is HIGGS, row 2 is KDDCup-99.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Let T = km, so we have in total T updates. Applying Lemma 3, Growth Recursion Lemma (Lemma 4),
and the fact that the gradient operators are 1-expansive, we have:
δt ≤

δt−1 + 2Lηt
if t = i∗ + jm,
j = 0, . . . , k − 1
δt−1 otherwise.
(8)
Unrolling the recursion completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. We have that
sup
S∼S ′
sup
r
‖A(r;S)−A(r;S ′)‖ ≤ 4L
β
k−1∑
j=0
1
mc + jm+ 1
 .
Therefore
4L
β
k−1∑
j=0
1
mc + jm+ 1
 = 4Lβ
 1mc + 1 +
k−1∑
j=1
1
mc + jm+ 1

≤ 4L
β
 1mc + 1m
k−1∑
j=1
1
j

≤ 4L
β
(
1
mc
+
lnk
m
)
as desired.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Let T = km, so we have in total T updates. We have the following recursion
δt ≤

(1− ηγ)δt−1 + 2ηL if t = i
∗ + jm,
j = 0,1, . . . , k − 1
(1− ηγ)δt−1 otherwise.
(9)
This is because at each pass different gradient update operators are encountered only at position i∗ (cor-
responding to the time step t = i∗ + jm), and so the two inequalities directly follow from the growth re-
cursion lemma (Lemma 4). Therefore, the contribution of the differing entry in the first pass contributes
2ηL(1−ηγ)T−i∗ , and generalizing this, the differing entry in the (j + 1)-th pass (j = 0,1, . . . , k −1) contributes
2ηL(1− ηγ)T−i∗−jm. Summing up gives the first claimed bound.
For sensitivity, we note that for j = 1,2, . . . , k, the j-th pass can only contribute at most 2ηL · (1−ηγ)(k−j)m
to δT . Summing up gives the desired result.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. From the Growth Recursion Lemma (Lemma 4) we know that in the γ-strongly convex case, with
appropriate step size, in each iteration either we have a contraction of δt−1, or, we have a contraction of δt−1
plus an additional additive term. In PSGD, in each pass the differing data point will only be encountered
once, introducing an additive term, and is contracted afterwards.
Formally, let T be the number of updates, the differing data point is at location i∗. Let ρt < 1 be the
expansion factor at iteration t. Then the first pass contributes δ∗1
∏T
t=i∗+1ρt to δT , the second pass contributes
δ∗2
∏T
t=i∗+m+1ρt to δT . In general pass j contributes δ
∗
j
∏T
t=i∗+(j−1)m+1ρt to δT .
Let ιj = δ∗j
∏T
t=i∗+(j−1)m+1ρt be the contribution of pass j to δT . We now figure out δ
∗
j and ρt . Consider ι1,
we consider two cases. If i∗ ≥ βγ , then ηt ≤ 1γt ≤ 1β , and so Gt is (1− ηtγ) = (1− 1t ) expansive. Thus if i∗ ≥ βγ
then before i∗ the gap is 0 and after i∗ we can apply expansiveness such that
2L
γt
·
km∏
i=t+1
(
1− 1
i
)
=
2L
γt
·
km∏
i=t+1
i − 1
i
=
2L
γkm
,
The remaining case is when i∗ ≤ βγ − 1. In this case we first have 1-expansiveness due to convexity that the
step size is bounded by 1β <
2
β . Moreover we have (1− 1t )-expansiveness for Gt when βγ ≤ t ≤m. Thus
2Lηi∗ ·
km∏
j= βγ
(
1− 1
j
)
≤ 2Lηi∗β/γ
km
= 2L · 1
β
· β
γkm
=
2L
γkm
,
Therefore ι1 ≤ 2Lγkm . Finally, for j = 2, . . . , k,
ιj ≤ 2Lγ((j − 1)m+ i∗) ·
km∏
t=(j−1)m+i∗+1
t − 1
t
=
2L
γkm
.
Summing up gives the desired result.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. The proof follows exactly the same argument as Theorem 1 of Zinkevich [38], except we change the
step size in the final accumulation of errors.
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A.6 Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. The output of the private PSGD algorithm is w˜ = w¯T + κ, where κ is distributed according to a
Gamma distribution Γ (d, ∆2ε ). By Lemma 1, ∆2 ≤ 2Lη = 2R√m . Therefore by Lemma 11, Eκ[LS (w˜)−LS (w¯m)] ≤
2dR
ε
√
m
, where we use the fact that the expectation of the Gamma distribution is d∆2ε . Summing up gives the
bound.
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Figure 9: More Accuracy Results with Private Tuning. Row 1 is HIGGS, row 2 is KDDCup-99.
B Results with Huber SVM
In this section we report results on Huber SVM. The standard SVM uses the hinge loss function, defined
by `SVM(w, (x,y)) = max(0,1 − y〈w,x〉), where x is the feature vector and y ∈ {±1} is the classification label.
However, hinge loss is not differentiable and so our results do not directly apply. Fortunately, it is possible
to replace hinge loss with a differentiable and smooth approximation, and it works pretty well either in
theory or in practice. Let z = y〈w,x〉, we use the following definition from [13],
`Huber(w, (x,y)) =

0 if z > 1 + h
1
4h (1 + h− z)2 if |1− z| ≤ h
1− z if z < 1− h
In this case one can show that (under the condition that all point are normalized to unit sphere) L ≤ 1 and
β ≤ 12h for `Huber, and our results thus apply.
Similar to the experiments with logistic regression, we use standard Huber SVM for the convex case, and
Huber SVM regularized by L2 regularizer for the strongly convex case. Figure 7 reports the accuracy results
in the case of tuning with a private tuning algorithm. Similar to the accuracy results on logistic regression
results, in all test cases our algorithms produce significantly more accurate models. In particular for MNIST
our accuracy is up to 6X better than BST14 and 2.5X better than SCS13.
C Test Accuracy Results on Additional Datasets
In this section we report test accuracy results on additional datasets: HIGGS7, and KDDCup-998. The test
accuracy results of logistic regression are reported in Figure 8 for tuning with public data, and in Figure 9
7https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/HIGGS.
8https://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html.
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for private tuning. These results further illustrate the advantages of our algorithms: For large datasets
differential privacy comes for free with our algorithms. In particular, HIGGS is a very large dataset with
m = 10,500,000 training points, and this largem reduces the noise to negligible for our algorithms, where we
achieve almost the same accuracy as noiseless algorithms. However, the test accuracy of SCS13 and BST14
are still notably worse than that of the noiseless version, especially for small ε. We find similar results for
Huber SVM.
D Accuracy vs. Mini-batch Size
In Figure 10 we report more experimental results when we increase mini-batch size from 50 to 200. Specif-
ically we test for four mini-batch sizes, 50,100,150,200. We report the test accuracy on MNIST using the
strongly convex optimization, and similar results hold for other optimization and datasets. Encouragingly,
we achieve almost native accuracy as we increase the mini-batch size. On the other hand, while the ac-
curacy also increases for SCS13 and BST14 for larger mini-batch sizes, their accuracy is still significantly
worse than our algorithms and noiseless algorithms.
E Sampling Laplace Noise
We discuss briefly how to sample from (3). We are given dimension d, L2-sensitivity ∆ and privacy param-
eter ε. In the first step, we sample a uniform vector in the unit ball, say v (this can be done, for example, by
a trick described in [8]). In the second step we sample a magnitude l from Gamma distribution Γ (d,∆/ε),
which can be done, for example, via standard Python API (np.random.gamma). Finally we output κ = lv.
The same algorithm is used in [13].
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(a) b = 50
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(b) b = 100
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(c) b = 150
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(d) b = 200
Figure 10: Mini-batch Size vs. Accuracy: More Results. We consider four mini-batch sizes
50,100,150,200.
F BST14 with Constant Number of Epochs
28
Algorithm 4 Convex BST14 with Constant Epochs
Require: `(·, z) is convex for every z, η ≤ 2/β.
Input: Data S, parameters k,ε,δ,d,L,R
1: function ConvexBST14ConstNpass(S,k,ε,δ,d,L,R)
2: m← |S |
3: T ← km
4: δ1 ← δ/km
5: ε1 ← Solution of ε = T ε1(eε1 − 1) +
√
2T ln(1/δ1)ε1
6: ε2 ←min(1,mε1/2)
7: σ2 ← 2ln(1.25/δ1)/ε22
8: w← 0
9: for t = 1,2, . . . ,T do
10: it ∼ [m] and let (xit , yit ) be the data point.
11: z ∼N (0,σ2ιId) . ι = 1 for logistic regression, and in general is the L2-sensitivity localized to an
iteration; Id is d-dimensional identity matrix.
12: w←∏W (w − ηt(∇`(w; (xit , yit ) + z)) where ηt = 2RG√t and G = √dσ2 + b2L2.
13: return wT
Algorithm 5 Strongly Convex BST14 with Constant Epochs
Input: Data S, parameters k,ε,δ,d,L,R
1: function StronglyConvexBST14ConstNpass(S,k,ε,δ,d,L,R)
2: m← |S |
3: T ← km
4: δ1 ← δ/km
5: ε1 ← Solution of ε = T ε1(eε1 − 1) +
√
2T ln(1/δ1)ε1
6: ε2 ←min(1,mε1/2)
7: σ2 ← 2ln(1.25/δ1)/ε22
8: w← 0
9: for t = 1,2, . . . ,T do
10: it ∼ [m] and let (xit , yit ) be the data point.
11: z ∼N (0,σ2ιId)
12: w←∏W (w − ηt(∇`(w; (xit , yit ) + z)), ηt = 1γt .
13: return w
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